method is first to criticize classical foundationalism. After showing its inadequacy, he then identifies certain immediate non-inferential beliefs which most persons would agree are reasonable to hold. Having established the reasonableness of such beliefs, he claims that religious beliefs are analogous to such commonly held nontheistic beliefs. I wish to examine Plantinga's claim that belief in God is properly basic within some non-classical version of foundationalism. First, the basic theory of Plantinga's Reformed epistemology shall be laid out. Then, I argue that his position is untenable as the method given by his account for demarcating proper and improper basic beliefs raises some difficulties. It is my contention that there are significant differences between theistic beliefs and properly basic nontheistic beliefs and so I question the legitimacy of asserting the proper basicality of theistic beliefs. Thus, Plantinga's central claim that theistic beliefs have the same epistemic status as other more commonly accepted nontheistic beliefs would be flawed. I also argue that Plantinga's account of criteria for proper basicality is not consistent.
Ⅰ.
In this paper I shall concern myself with the question of whether theistic belief could be rational without propositional evidence or any support by argument. In a series of articles Plantinga juxtaposes what he calls 'Reformed epistemology' (or Calvinist epistemology) with 'classical foundationalism' (which he finds in Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Hume, and many others) and concludes that the theist is rationally justified in believing in God without much further evidence. 1) Plantinga's method is first to criticize classical foundationalism. After showing its inadequacy, he then identifies certain immediate non-inferential beliefs which most persons would agree are reasonable to hold, such as "I see a tree", "I ate breakfast this morning", or "that person is in pain."
Having established the reasonableness of such beliefs, he claims that religious beliefs are analogous to such commonly held nontheistic can be judged properly basic and others not even in the absence of criteria to judge justifiably that "1 + 1 = 2" is properly basic but that "The Great Pumpkin will return next Halloween" is not.
Here, it should be noted that, when Plantinga criticizes strong foundationalism, he is not rejecting foundationalism as such. He still accepts the foundationalist's distinction between basic and derived beliefs, as well as the assumption that there must be properly basic beliefs from which all of our other beliefs have to be derived if they are to be rationally justified. What he rejects is merely the classical foundationalist's overly restrictive criterion for what can qualify as properly basic beliefs.
How, then, should one decide what beliefs can be properly basic? Or, how, then, should one approach the problem of the criteria for proper basicality? Here, Plantinga does not offer any criteria for proper basicality, but he does suggest that the manner of arriving at such will be broadly inductive.
The proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, broadly speaking, inductive. We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such that the former are obviously properly basic in the latter, and examples of beliefs and conditions such that the former are not properly basic in the latter. We must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and sufficient conditions of proper basicality and test these hypotheses by reference to those examples. 12) Plantinga, following Chisholm, pursues the option of 'particularism' rather than 'methodism'. 13 accompanying belief that indeed the Lord is to be thanked and praised. 16) Plantinga claims that belief in God is properly grounded in other beliefs, such as "God is speaking to me" and "God forgives me", which are properly basic. They are analogous to perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, and beliefs about other minds. In proper circumstances (e.g., where there is no reason to believe that my noetic structure 17) is defective), my having an experience of a certain sort confers on me the right to hold the belief in question. 18) In like manner, having religious experiences is properly basic in the right circumstances. In this sense, strictly speaking, it is not belief in God that is properly basic for Plantinga, but rather beliefs such as the belief that God is speaking to me, that God forgives me, that God has created all this, and that God is to be thanked and praised. 19) However, since beliefs of this sort self-evidently entail that God exists, Plantinga believes that there is no harm in speaking a bit loosely and talking as if the relatively abstract, high-level proposition "God exists" is itself properly basic. 20) 16) Ibid., p. 80. 17) For a discussion of Plantinga's notion of noetic structure, see RBG pp.
48-50; "A person's noetic structure is the set of propositions he believes together with certain epistemic relations that hold among him and these propositions." Plantinga analyzes the noetic structure from the point of view of foundationalism in general. There are three ways of classifying the contents of our noetic structure: (1) in terms of basicality; (2) in terms of degree of belief; and (3) But to say that classical foundationalism fails in its task, and theistic beliefs do not have to conform to foundationalist criteria is not to say that belief in God is properly basic. Plantinga's strategy is based on the argument that some beliefs about God's action and attributes can function as properly basic beliefs, and since these beliefs entails God's existence, theism is thereby justified.
Let us return to the 'Great Pumpkin' objection. Plantinga's reply was, first, that not all judgments about proper basicality need be grounded in criteria, and second, that Reformed epistemology allows for the inductive formulation of such criteria. These replies certainly show that 21) Plantinga makes a distinction between evidence and non-evidential ground.
Evidence consists of beliefs on the basis of which other, non-basic beliefs are held, whereas grounds are not beliefs at all, but conditions or circumstances that occasion properly basic beliefs, and thereby justify them without being formulated as beliefs. To have evidence for a belief is to hold that belief on the basis of other beliefs which one consciously takes as supporting it. To have grounds for a belief, however, is to hold it in such way that there are conditions in which it arises and that justify it, even though the believer may typically be unaware at the moment of what those conditions are. To sum up, Plantinga does not give any criteria to help us distinguish in advance of his inductive procedure unacceptable from acceptable candidates for proper basicality, but merely suggests that the manner of arriving at such will be broadly inductive. Plantinga's point is that it is not his concern to make judgments about other people's rationality.
Perhaps his only concern is to show that the fact that someone accepts the existence of God as properly basic doesn't mean that that person is thereby committed to accepting practically any belief as properly basic. Maybe we can speak for ourselves, but we cannot impose standards of proper basicality on others. Consequently, it leads Plantinga to claim that there is a certain relativity in the process of searching for criteria for proper basicality.
Since different people regard different beliefs as non-inferentially obvious, it is not to be expected that the inductive formulation of criteria will result in the same set of criteria for everybody. If two people start with fundamentally different views of proper basicality, then the rules that they construct on those views will also be quite different.
They may even be incompatible. However, since a person's rules derive from her views, she can hardly expect her rules to apply to someone who starts with a fundamentally different set of examples. This seems to imply that a belief might be rationally accepted as basic by one person but equally rationally rejected by another. Again, it all depends on which set of beliefs is initially taken as obviously properly basic.
This point has led to another objection that has been stated by Gary
Gutting.
How can a believer just blithely claim that it's utterly obvious that he's entitled to believe without having any reasons for his belief? What of the fact that there are all sorts of honest and intelligent people who've thought a lot about religious belief and simply don't see belief in God as properly basic? … As philosophers, we surely have to take as clear cases only those that would be admitted as such by just about any rational person. 23) Gutting also argues that the theist may not include belief in God in his set of properly basic beliefs because there is widespread disagreement about the c1aim. 24) He contends that when there is widespread disagreement about a truth among one's intellectual peers (people who are roughly equivalent in intelligence and education), then that claim needs to be justified by an argument. Given disagreement among intellectual peers about the existence of God, Gutting holds, the theist needs to justify the claim that there is a God; the theist cannot take belief in God as basic. For example, a mathematician ought to take account of her opponents' views. She should see whether they have any good arguments against her views and, if she concludes that they do not, she must see if there is any reason to trust her opponents' judgment rather than her own on this point. But even if there is no reason to prefer their judgment to her own, she should be moved from her certainty by the fact of their difference. To cling tenaciously to her intuition rather than weakening her hold on the proposition is to be guilty of 'epistemological egoism' 25) which is just as 'arbitrary and unjustifiable as ethical egoism is generally regarded to be.' 26) That is, there is something like peer review of important propositions within any given field. While such review may not always cause us to give a belief that we cannot defend, it ought, at least, to cause us to loosen our grasp on the belief, to realize that we could be wrong, and to hold with a lesser degree of certainty than before.
Plantinga is well aware of this objection. His response is as follows:
Criteria for proper basically … should be … argued to and tested by a relevant set of examples. But there is no reason to assume, in advance, that everyone will agree on the examples. The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is entirely proper and rational; if he does not accept this belief on the basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madalyn Murray O'Hair may disagree; but how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the Christian community, conform to their examples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs. 27) 25) Cf. Jay Van Hook, "Knowledge, Belief, and Reformed Epistemology" The Reformed Journal 31 (1981) Plantinga notes that there is no universal agreement on any substantive issue in epistemology. Why should we expect or demand that there be universal agreement on the base examples used to establish criteria for proper basicality? Or why should the theist be barred from placing examples of theistic beliefs in the base set simply because of lack of universal approval? Plantinga's point here is that a theistic philosopher is fully justified in taking "God exists" to be a properly basic belief, even if others do not agree. That is, all a person needs to do to be rational in holding basic theistic belief in a properly basic way is to meet the criteria of only her own theistic community. At this point, he is in effect giving up something that has often been thought of as an important goal of the philosophical enterprise. 28) Philosophers have often assumed that if they hit upon the right method of approaching philosophical problems, and applied that method carefully, then agreement on substantive conclusions would be bound to result. Plantinga is saying that it was unreasonable to expect this in the first place -that philosophers come to their task bringing with them deeply rooted prephilosophical commitments, and these commitments may sometimes make reaching substantive agreement on important philosophical questions impossible even if both sides in a dispute are equally well informed and fully rational.
Plantinga's point here is that rationality theory is a community-relative project. If someone starts with a set of basic beliefs fundamentally different from ours, then our conception of rationality need not apply to that person. The question of whether Plantinga's claims are correct in his account of community relative rationality is beyond the scope of this paper. It does not seem to be possible to settle such disagreements belief only if nearly everyone is nontheistic, whereas only the theist will be led to form a theistic belief. Although both theist and nontheist experience awe at the beauty of universe, only the theist will form a belief about God's creativity. Or take another example: both theist and nontheist stare into a glorious star-filled sky. But in the theist this experience immediately prompts the belief that God made star, whereas the non theist will forms only the belief "I see stars."
Whose response is the correct one? Or are they both correct? What I am saying is that this universality of belief formation indicates the firmly grounded nature of the perceptual, and since the experience that generates the theistic belief does not provide universality, it does not provide sufficient grounds for proper basicality. Thus, Plantinga 
